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Foreword
Transitional justice: (re)conceptualising the field
Christine Bell, Colm Campbell and Fionnuala N Aolþin
Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster1
Transitional justice discourse is generally accepted as having its foundations located in the theore-
tical, policy and practical implications of dealing with past human rights violations in societies that
have experienced either repressive politics or violent conflict. Many theorists and policy-makers
resolutely assume or defend the notion that ‘dealing with the past’ is where the debates about, and
contribution of, the transitional justice paradigm uniquely lie.2 Understood in this way, transitional
justice as a field of study has grown exponentially, comprising theoretical debates, the comparative
assessment of domestic accountability schemes, international criminal justice, the study of truth
commissions, and ethical-legal debate concerning the morality of compromise on accountability for
gross and systematic violations of human rights.
This foreword, building on the previous work of its authors,3 extends and expands our conten-
tion that transitional justice in this narrow sense must be located in a broader and more problema-
tised understanding of justice in contemporary transitions. We also use the opportunity provided by
this symposium to highlight an expansion of conceptual horizons being carried out at the
Transitional Justice Institute (University of Ulster), and the innovative approach to the transitional
justice field being advanced by a group of diverse inter-disciplinary scholars. The approach advocates
both drawing on other disciplines, and firmly supporting parallel disciplinary fields to work along-
side a legal research agenda; affirming the importance of rigorous cross-jurisdictional comparisons;
and utilising empirical and socio-legal methodology to advance legal inquiry.
We affirm, as we have previously asserted, that transitional justice constitutes a field of inquiry that
both affirms but also problematises the role of law in situations of societal change (Bell, Campbell and
Nı´ Aola´in, 2004). We are not concerned to enter a debate that we view as essentially semantic, namely
whether the term ‘transitional justice’ should be used primarily to communicate a narrow or broader
meaning. Rather, we wish firmly to assert our vision of a continuum which extends from a narrow
(past-focused) notion of ‘transitional justice’ to a broader consideration of the role of law in transitions
(itself a subset of the question of justice in transition). From this perspective, it is clear that the legal
frame of reference is only one dimension of a broader attempt at social and political change.
This points to the underlying project on any ‘law in context’ exploration – to question the
complexities of what it means to ‘normativise’ what could be seen (and indeed at the beginning of
the 1990s were argued to be) questions for the realm of politics. We have suggested elsewhere that
‘transitional justice’ does not have an even meaning across contexts, as illustrated by the
1 We note our thanks to Catherine O’Rourke, Transitional Justice Institute, for research assistance in comple-
ting this foreword and to Dr Shane Darcy for his oversight in bringing the work of this symposium to
fruition.
2 See e.g. Bickford (2004): ‘Transitional Justice refers to a field of activity and inquiry focused on how societies
address legacies of past human rights abuses, mass atrocity, or other forms of severe social trauma, including
genocide or civil war, in order to build a more democratic, just or peaceful future.’
3 This foreword also gives us a substantial opportunity to respond to critical probing of our analytical
approach. See e.g. Hannum (2006).
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appropriation of the language of ‘transitional justice’ in pursuit of hegemonic legitimation in Iraq
(Bell, Campbell and Nı´ Aola´in, 2007) (a point explored further below).4 Such minefields caution
vigilance but not timidity as we proceed.
1. Transitional justice as dealing with the past
We acknowledge that the field’s roots lie squarely in controversies over accountability, where in
Koskenniemi’s (2002) terms the ‘ . . . universalisation of the Rule of Law [called] for the realization of
criminal responsibility in the international as in the domestic sphere’. Transitional justice as the
study of mechanisms focused on past abuses can be traced to the post-Second World War Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals. In the 1980s and 1990s the field was reinvigorated and invested with new
meaning as a response to the systematic human rights violations carried out by repressive Latin
American states, the transitions in Eastern Europe, and peace negotiations in an ever-expanding list
of ‘intra-state’ conflicts. Two trends can be identified in this latter period. The first was a rise in
innovative Truth Commission-type mechanisms as a way of squaring accountability v. amnesty
debates, that were characterised by being rooted in broad range of justice and social goals other
than individual criminal accountability. These goals were implemented by de-legalised processes
justified both in terms of pragmatic and principled arguments as more suitable to the outcomes
sought.5 The second (apparently antithetical) trend was the rise in international criminal justice,
evident in the establishment of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals and the Ad hoc Tribunal for
Sierra Leone, and the institutionalisation of such initiatives in the creation of an International
Criminal Court.6
The broader project of considering ‘justice in transition’ responds directly to the past-focused
conception of transitional justice. We assert, first, that mechanisms for dealing with the past cannot
be considered without locating them in the broader question of the connection between mechan-
isms for the past and the broader constitutional frameworks that the methods are in service to.
Viewed from the wider perspective of ‘constitutional meta-bargaining’,7 the role of law in dealing
with the past appears contingent. This approach questions any idealisation of the end game of a
narrowly delineated ‘transitional justice’ discourse, defined purely in terms of criminal accountabil-
ity, lustration or state-building (including definitions resting upon such underlying theories as
liberalisation or deterrence).8
Related to this is our second assertion that ‘past-focused’ mechanisms are in practice negotiated
as merely one part of a transformation package. Meaningful societal change (of which accountability
is likely to be a key part) requires the overhaul of political, legal and social institutions. Political
trade-offs frequently occur across a variety of issues, with the result that the factors affecting which
mechanism is put in place cannot be fully understood without appreciating their place in the overall
package.
4 See also Bell and O’Rourke (2007), arguing in conclusion that the justice meaning of transitional justice varies
from context to context.
5 For an exploration of the gender specific limitations of transitional accountability mechanisms, see Nı´ Aola´in
and Turner (2007).
6 For a detailed overview of this genealogy, see Teitel (2003).
7 On meta-constitutionalism, see Walker (2002).
8 Koskenniemi (2002) has, inter alia, identified that: ‘ . . . studies on the transformations of authoritarian
regimes into more or less liberal democracies . . . have suggested a more complex understanding of the role
of criminal trials as not merely about punishment or retribution, not indeed about deterrence, but as aspects
of a larger ‘‘transitional justice’’ .’
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2. From transitional justice to rule of law
To some extent, recent developments relating to ‘transitional justice’ in its narrower sense have
begun to affirm these types of connections. Most notably, in a policy context, the United Nations
Secretary-General has recognised an organic relationship between ‘transitional justice’ and the rule
of law (United Nations Secretary-General, 2004). This recognition has vital policy implications,
signalling both the broad institutional appropriation of the term ‘transitional justice’, as well as the
fact that it is fast becoming a by-word for a bundle of transformative efforts, mostly of a legal nature.
That recognition has ignited a broader international policy conversation to which, we suggest, this
theoretical re-mapping has an important contribution to make.9
While focus on the rule of law locates ‘transitional justice’ within a broader framework, it also
prompts the question of ‘which concept of the rule of law?’ – and in particular whether a formal
(procedural) or substantive (value-based) emphasis is to be preferred. If the former, then the
programme of reform seems to be a technical bureaucratic one in which international organisations
can play a seemingly uncontroversial role by assisting in rolling out reform of constitutionalised
legal institutions: an independent judiciary, separation of powers, an impartial and accountable
police force? However, if a more substantive articulation is preferred – or understood to be impli-
cated in formal understandings of the rule of law – then the crucial question is: what values or whose
values does it presuppose?10
Whether the ‘rule of law’ is to be understood in procedural or substantive terms, is essentially a
philosophy of law debate. This very debate risks diverting attention from a key insight of the law and
society movement: the well-documented capacity for law (even, or perhaps especially, in societies
with an ideological commitment to the ‘rule of law’) to be an instrument of gender, ethnic, economic
and class oppression. Moreover, transitions add new practical and conceptual complexity to long-
standing rule of law debates. Transitions are typically situations in which the very concept of the rule
of law appears to require rehabilitation precisely because it has operated as the chassis to which the
vehicle of systemic human rights violations has been harnessed. The paradox arises because law as a
tool of reform must itself be radicalised to function appropriately in the new dispensation.
Domestic law’s hegemonic quality – its tendency to buttress powerful societal forces, make it an
unreliable check on oppressive power even in settled societies, yet its ‘relative autonomy’ and its
associated counter-hegemonic potential mean that it cannot entirely be dismissed as a vehicle for
progressive societal change. The question of law’s capacity to deliver (or hinder) meaningful change
in transitional societies is an open one, and must be considered part of a broad ‘transitional justice’
research agenda. At the very least, there needs to be an awareness that legalism, a focus on law’s
normativity, and the imperative to frame questions in legal terms, may privilege elite understand-
ings, and render invisible key issues affecting disenfranchised groups (Campbell, Nı´ Aola´in and
Harvey, 2003). A broader understanding of law’s operation in societal transitions is likely to require
an investigation of the deployment of law by disenfranchised social movements, an investigation
that will need to involve disciplines other than law, and one that is likely to focus at least on much on
law as a system of communication and on its instrumentality, as on its normativity. It is also likely to
require cross-jurisdictional comparisons, not least because such comparisons offer a route to separ-
ating the specificity of the local from recurring patterns in relation to the deployment of law.
9 See also Kritz (1996), who argues that: ‘The rule of law does not simply provide yet one more vehicle by
which government can wield and abuse its awesome power; to the contrary, it establishes principles that
constrain the power of government, oblige it to conduct itself according to a series of prescribed and
publicly known rules.’ But cf. Paris (2004).
10 For a useful summary of different approaches to the rule of law that also illustrates some inevitable linkage
between formal and substantive conceptions, see Craig (1997); see also Carothers (1998).
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Transitional justice ‘from below’ demands exploration with at least as much urgency as that ‘from
above’.
Secondly, with their unique international/domestic ‘hybridity’ (Bell, 2006), transitions pose a
particular ‘law in context’ question around what the context for understanding rule of law value-
formation is, and in particular whether the frame of reference is an international one in which values
are understood with reference to international standards, a domestic one located in domestic
constitutional understandings, or one in which the meaning is constructed dialogically through
on-going negotiation (either within the domestic sphere, or in a broader negotiation across both
spheres).
In the contemporary uni-multipolar world, this begs the question adverted to earlier, of the
relationship between the world’s sole remaining superpower, international law, and transitional
justice, with Iraq as the prime site of inquiry. In many respects the international law debate mirrors
that in domestic law: international law is likely to accommodate itself to the exercise of hegemonic
power (Campbell, 2005), and offers powerful legitimating potential, but some possibility for law-
based challenge is likely to be present (Krisch, 2005), and international law is always likely to retain
some ‘pull’, even on powerful states (Byers, 2003). This pull may be particularly strong in transitional
societies where a context of conflict can no longer be invoked to justify departure from international
standards. Equally, the intimate oversight relationship between international institutions and such
societies creates powerful incentives for such state to ‘play ball’ (or be seen to) with international
legal norms.
In Iraq, the US has used past-focused transitional justice discourse to justify and underwrite the
‘de-Ba’athicisation’ processes, attempting at a subtle level to justify its own role as ‘democratiser’
rather than ‘occupier’. ‘The’ conflict (or the undemocratic era for which accountability is required) is
thereby defined as the one that preceded and was ‘ended’ by its use of force (Bell, Campbell and Nı´
Aola´in, 2007). Prisoner ill-treatment in Abu-Ghraib, and other alleged abuses in Iraq fall outside this
frame; to that extent, there is an attempt to employ ‘transitional justice’ both as a framing narrative
that doubles as an instrument of hegemonic power. Whether the US will succeed or not in this
attempt is an open question, one given particular salience by identifying Iraq as merely one site in a
never-ending (and to that extent ‘ordinary’) ‘war on terror’. The complexity here is evident from the
inter-connectedness of transitional justice with multiple and overlapping spheres of international
law, as well as from its becoming knitted into the unsettled sphere of local law (which itself is
reconfigured by external legal interface to ‘fit’ the transitional narrative being advanced).11
Recognition of the ambivalent role of domestic law in societal transitions must thus be an accom-
panied by a appreciation of the ambivalent position occupied by transitional justice in the con-
temporary world, particularly where it is yoked to the instrumental goals of the ‘war on terror’
(Teitel, 2003).
3. The symposium
This symposium reflects some of the constitutive elements of this broadening and revisioning. It
also reflects unique methodological strengths. These strengths include a broad inter-disciplinary
approach to the analysis of transitional problems, a socio-legal dimension to conduct of legal inquiry,
an affirmation of the value of doctrinal analysis in the transitional setting, an emphasis on mid-level
theorising about legal institutions, norms and ‘messaging’, in order to probe their transformative
capacity.
11 On global-local interface in transition, see Campbell and Fionnuala (2003).
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So, for example, ‘dealing with past’ remains a core aspect of the transitional justice inquiry, but is
given fresh vitality in the symposium. The contribution made by Kirk Simpson entitled Voices
Silenced, Voices Rediscovered confirms the centrality of the past to the construction of legal and
political futures, with its emphasis on the need to reclaim the ‘pre-language’ state which frequently
obscures the ability of victims to contribute effectively to truth processes. Precisely because the
analysis locates law within an anthropological understanding, it demonstrates the manner in which
existing literature on voice and victims can be re-interpreted and reinvigorated by understanding
law’s limits as a language.
Venkat Iyer’s contribution to this symposium is concerned with the importance of constitutional
structures and norms in the transitional phase. This emphasis on norm content, its institutional
outworkings and constitutional configurations augment the contention we make that transitional
justice is fundamentally concerned with the operation and rehabilitation of law in post conflict and
repressive societies. Iyer’s assessment demonstrates the importance of the local/global interchange
for enriching the transitional justice field.
Complementing this approach is the contribution by McKeever and O’Rawe, who highlight the
significance of institutional legal reform through a succinct assessment of the relationship between
citizenship, policing and the role of ex-combatants in post-conflict societies. The essential quandary
they address is framed by exploring the question of whether paramilitary ex-prisoners should be
allowed to join the police force. The article affirms the broader linkage between transitional justice
narrowly defined, with rule of law issues generally defined, as well as the concrete contribution that
institutional change has for the success of the transitional project – particularly to those who have
been excluded or marginalised in the prior dispensation.
Finally, the work of Rooney and Reilly brings gender to the forefront of transitional justice
explorations. Both contributions are grounded in the broad inter-disciplinary methods advocated in
this foreword, and both attest to the strength of analysis that emerges when the role of law is
interposed alongside rigorous feminist method. Rooney’s contribution tackles a key legal site of
transitional justice – namely the peace agreement – and undertakes an ambitious interweaving of
intersectionality theory with the presence or absence of women in such sites. The analysis again
confirms the pivotal influence that legal frames have on outcomes, and the organic link between
institutional decision-making sites with transformative outcomes. Reilly undertakes a critical con-
sideration of dominant approaches to transitional justice, and probes what is necessary to achieve
‘justice’ for women in transitional context. Her extensive survey of international accountability
mechanisms is notably informed by considering the merits of a ‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top down’
approach to gender accountability, and places significant emphasis on comparative knowledge as to
the influence of transnational influences on processes which affect women.
4. Transition, justice and law
What then are the elements that need to be developed in the broader conception of the field?
(a) Understanding transition
Transitions have been at the margins of traditional legal categories. Similar, for example, to legal
doctrines of exceptionality, transitions often stood at the sidelines of legal and theoretical scholar-
ship.12 This is no longer the case. The number and scale of societies experiencing transition from
repression and/or conflict allied to the broader geo-political effects of instability and inter-dependence
caused by it, and the growth of the international tribunal model, have meant that transitional justice
12 See Oren and Nı´ Aola´in (2006) for a detailed overview of the exception and its marginal place in legal
scholarship historically.
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has become an overarching legal and political mantle to accommodate, manage and prompt such
change. One contemporary feature of the discourse is the blurring of definitional boundaries about
what is ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the transitionary paradigm. This can be viewed either as a denial of the
specificity of transitions from conflict (Posner and Vermeule, 2004), or as an attempt to unsettle
established constitutional orders so as to radicalise and re-envision processes of democratic
renewal.13 From this point of view, arguments about what constitutes ‘the field’ become difficult
to separate from strategic instrumentalism regarding what that the assertion of ‘transitional justice’
as the frame of inquiry aims to achieve.14 But ambivalences identified above in the problematic
contemporary employment of transitional justice discourse also manifest under this heading.
Current ‘steady state’ transitional justice (evident in the creation of the International Criminal
Court) may operate to universalise the exception. The concept may therefore be open to appropria-
tion in an attempt to re-work mainstream understandings of international legal norms. What was
viewed as a legal phenomenon associated with extraordinary post-conflict conditions now increas-
ingly appears to be a reflection of ordinary times. This poses extra-ordinary challenges to the
integrity of the field.
(b) Understanding of justice
It becomes evident that, in addition to the reframing we have outlined above, the conception of
transitional justice implies that some understanding and even theory of ‘justice’ is either implicit or
required. In this vein of analysis ‘justice’ often stands as a short-cut for ‘law’ or ‘legal’. Such an analysis
is extremely loose analytically but has the advantage of providing a very large canvas – it is not
limited to dealing with the past. Transitional justice on this understanding could broadly cover the
role of law in situations of transition. Despite its ease we do not use this analytical shortcut. In our
view, it holds two distinct disadvantages: first, it makes Transitional Justice essentially a game for
lawyers. It eschews a broader inter-disciplinary capacity and ensures that political scientists, sociol-
ogists, anthropologists and others are marginalised.15 Second, it glosses over some complex and
relevant jurisprudential debates concerning the content of ‘justice’, and it gives no sense of the
continuum of interface which we prompt reflection on in this foreword.
A second approach is to view justice in the context of theories of justice. This is arguably where
legal theory is now turning. It is unnecessary at this point to probe the array of justice theories on
offer; suffice to say that there are a great variety of theoretical explorations of the concept of justice,
many of which can usefully be explored in relation to the specifics of ‘transition’. Taking this
approach has a number of advantages. Primarily, it opens the field to the broad and deep inter-
disciplinary engagement that we suggest is critical to any expansive understanding of transitional
justice. Importantly, transitional justice is then no longer narrowly confined to a lawyers’ discourse.
Second, it takes the theoretical debates from the transitional context and forces their engagement
with mainstream ‘justice’ scholarship. It also has a number of disadvantages. First, it tends to
encourage a narrow competitive trade-off between differing theories of justice (my theory is ‘better’,
or at least ‘bigger’ than yours), potentially focusing on philosophy of law quandaries to the neglect of
socio-legal insights. Second, the emphasis on theory choice and fit tends to assume or defend, rather
than interrogate the goals of transition.
The way forward that we are traversing, as illustrated by this symposium, is one that first of all
disaggregates the different points at which law ‘connects’ with transition adopting what can loosely
13 See Bell and O’Rourke (2007, pp. 42–4). Cf. Tully (1995).
14 Cf. Berman (2004); cf. also Bell, Campbell and Nı´ Aola´in (2007).
15 See Campbell, Gross and Nı´ Aola´in (2007) arguing for a deep inter-disciplinary approach to contemporary
conflict-related legal problems; see also Campbell and Connolly (2006).
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be called a ‘law in context’ approach to each one, that eschews any understanding of law as purely
normative, or indeed as indistinguishable from politics.16 We have laid these points of connection as
follows:
. Understanding the role of law in conflict.
. Law and Political institutions (constitutionalism).
. Law and Legal institutions (‘rule of law’).
. Dealing with the past (‘transitional justice’).
. Gender issues (cross-cutting and also a discrete field of inquiry, and capable of expansion into a
broader conception of all the ‘others’ seen as marginal to the violent conflict).
. Law and social movements (transitional justice ‘from below’).
Second, we attempt to understand the role of law in transitions by using (sometimes on their own,
often together), a range of methodologies, so as to understand how law is conceived to apply or not
apply in a positive sense, but to assist with understanding the role of law in context. These
methodologies primarily include:
. Legal doctrinal (focused around the lack of ‘fit’ between transition and traditional international
legal doctrine).
. Socio-legal and more broadly interdisciplinary (aiming to understand the role and limits of law
within a contextualised understanding of its relationship to politics and other social processes);
we affirm that this may involve analysis of both qualitative and quantitative empirical data.
. Theoretical (theorising transition and justice, and their inclusions and exclusions).
To put it boldly, we view study of ‘transition and justice’ as providing an important contribution to
some of the deepest quandaries of law’s relationship to social change, well beyond the transitional
context.
Conclusion: (re)conceptualising the field
In conclusion, we are pleased that this Special Issue of the Journal of Law in Context has afforded the
opportunity for a selection of the diverse and inter-disciplinary research agenda of the Transitional
Justice Institute to be drawn together and presented here. The range of scholarly interests, and the
rare mix of legal and other disciplinary approaches to core transitional issues, illustrate precisely the
themes that this foreword has sought to highlight; namely that the field of transitional justice has
widened and deepened – that it is not the domain of lawyers alone – and that it is no longer solely
probing accountability concerns. Rather, the field is now firmly engaged in a wider set of inquiries
about the role of law in the process of societal change – and the interface and consequences that
follow for what we understand law to be.
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